A UN Force Commander’s saga

The travails of UNAMSIL - https://www.thecitizen.in/in-depth/peace-keeping-in-troubled-times-1148231

General VK Jetley has finally self-published his version of the travails of the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), of which he was the Force Commander.

Below, passages from another book are contrasted with his version to suggest that his is an important contribution to military history of both the Indian army and UN peacekeeping.

On the activity of British forces who arrived in early May to evacuate their nationals as part of their Operation Palliser, Jetley writes:

After completion of the British evacuation operation, the British Task Force Commander was perhaps accorded permission by his country to fly Harrier jets and Chinooks over Freetown in a show of force…. While it is necessary to give credit to the British for this show of force, it is also necessary to dispel the myth that the RUF (Revolutionary United Front) was poised to attack Freetown and that they were deterred by the presence of one battalion of the British in Sierra Leone.

In contrast, Kofi Annan, then UN Secretary General (SG), in his memoirs, Interventions, recalls the episode thus:

After a deeply troubled period for the UN peacekeeping mission in Sierra Leone in 1999 and early 2000, in which the entire mission looked set to collapse due to the intransigent and brutal intentions of the factions to the conflict there, I was able to call upon the support of the UK (United Kingdom) prime minister Tony Blair. Rather than watch Sierra Leone fall into another bout of atrocious civil war of the kind that had devastated the country throughout the 1990s, what followed in May 2000 was a decisive military intervention by the British military task force that routed the rebel factions and returned the balance to Sierra Leone’s political system. The UN operation was saved as was Sierra Leone, in large part to the courageous leadership of Tony Blair….

From a reading of the book, it can be anticipated that the general would have a hearty laugh over Annan’s version above. Jetley quite categorically states:

Nothing is further from the truth as this was never the case and UNAMSIL Force Headquarters made it clear to the DPKO (Department of Peacekeeping Operations), the press and anyone else who cared to listen, that there was no threat from the RUF rebels to Freetown…. Code cables sent to DPKO at that time would support this statement.

Code cables presumably inform the SG’s report to the Security Council. The report covering the period appears oblivious to the input from the mission, putting the Secretariat perspective in the following words:

A pivotal factor in restoring stability was the arrival of United Kingdom troops on 7 May and of a substantial British naval presence offshore a week later. The deployment of British troops at Lungi airport and in the western part of Freetown had as its objective the safe evacuation of nationals of the United Kingdom and others for whom it was responsible. Nevertheless, this presence boosted the confidence of the Sierra Leoneans, and enabled UNAMSIL to redeploy much needed troops to areas east of Freetown.

At the outset of the crisis, I (the SG) called upon those Member States with the capacity to deploy well-trained and well-equipped troops to constitute a rapid reaction force to provide UNAMSIL with the necessary deterrent capacity. In this regard, I very much welcome the decision made by the United Kingdom to deploy a spearhead battalion and other assets which, although sent for national reasons, was instrumental in restoring calm in Freetown….

The contrary perspective of the Force Commander on the ground is scathing.

Jetley makes clear that the Nigerian contingent deployed for the protection of the airfield did not need any hand-holding. The British on arrival inserted themselves in its protection without so much as a by-your-leave from the Force, which to Jetley shows up the afterlife of a colonial power.

Jetley goes on to reveal the British commandeering the Sierra Leonean air assets for unnecessary strafing of supposed rebel positions ahead, resulting in targeting of civilians and, thereby, constituting International Humanitarian War (IHL) violations, arguably amounting to war crimes.

The book’s revelations require incorporation into the information available on such landmark episodes. The subaltern view is now available to, if warranted, revise the popular version of events.

The British narrative is the dominant one, finding its way into peacekeeping pedagogy, with one such tract claiming, ‘British troops defended parts of Freetown and Lungi International Airport, and set up patrols on the streets of Freetown and the main highway leading out of the capital. British officers also sat in on UN military planning sessions….’

More pertinently, the book is also significant from broadening the understanding on the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine that was then under construction.

Kofi Annan’s para above saluting Blair informs of, ‘a culture of humanitarian intervention seemed to be growing also in the actions of may of the global powers. This is evident from the determination of some of the most impressive international leaders during my time as secretary-general to respond to this call.’

The British can be seen to be manufacturing a crisis where none existed of the claimed proportions so as to lend ballast to the R2P doctrine being cooked up. Jetley’s recall of the British force and its commander, a brigadier’s, actions show up the British, a declining great power, even at that time, searching desperately for legitimacy as a great power and credibility of its seat amongst the Permanent Five of the Security Council.

This is clear from another episode recounted by Jetley in which he is petitioned by the British permanent representative (PR) to the UN to pitch for a Chapter VII mission during his brief at the Security Council on the mission’s activity.

The British PR surely had read the SG’s report that had put such advocacy in perspective, and yet he wished to fire the gun from Jetley’s shoulders. The SG report had it:

…many Member States advocated that UNAMSIL should be given a strong peace-enforcement mandate under Chapter VII of the Charter…. I am not opposed to such a mandate in principle, as long as the United Nations is able to obtain, from Member States with ready capacity, the necessary resources to carry out the tasks that such a mandate implies.

Jetley is quite clear that without the participation of competent military forces in missions, peace enforcement would be a pipedream. He made a pitch for a brigade each separately with the PRs of the US and the UK to little avail. The West too was clear that it was not about to get into the mud, preferring to leave African problems to African ministrations.

Thus, without furnishing the resources, Security Council minders, as the penholder on Sierra Leone, the British, wished for peace enforcement – the quelling of recalcitrant signatories as the RUF. Incidentally, the British had given some 10000 weapons to a rival faction, only prior to the arrival of Jetley in the mission.

The first part of Jetley’s book shows up the wishfulness of enforcement, informing of the incapacity of the contingents furnished to the UN by member states, noted in an SG report on the findings of an after-crisis review.

Jetley is particularly incensed with Nigerians.

In the event, it appears that their wheeling dealing led to his ousting from the post of Force Commander.

The sorry episode was brought about by an unknown actor hacking into his computer to pull out a personal note-to-self he had written up in wake of the crisis in the mission area in May. The note was put in the open domain with the intention of creating bad blood within the mission by embarrassing those involved, who would then turn on Jetley.

The crisis in question had witnessed force elements handing over weapons and turning themselves in as hostages to the RUF without a challenge. Jetley had been put out by their pusillanimity.

Jetley was particularly struck by the crisis breaking out precisely at the time the West African regional organisation, ECOWAS’ Ceasefire Monitoring Group, ECOMOG, wound up, with the Nigerian contingent being spared the indignities inflicted on the other country troops held hostage.

This, to Jetley, shows up the complicity of the Nigerians with the RUF and among other matters led to his conviction that the Nigerians were up to little good in Sierra Leone.

Though beginning on a Chapter VI note, the mission had acquired Chapter VII cover for the increments to its mandate resulting from the departure of the ECOMOG. The initial mandate was to assist ECOMOG with disarmament as agreed to in the Lomé peace accord.

However, the Nigerians, in particular, wanting the re-hatting of the ECOMOG into a UN mission, were outflanked by the UN authorising the UNAMSIL to take over the responsibilities of the ECOMOG.

While there is no record of why this change occurred, it can be inferred that the UN was not blind to the Nigerian-RUF nexus with diamond trade at its bottom. The UN moved to sanction ‘blood diamonds’ under Chapter VII during Jetley’s tenure, culminating in the Kimberley process on conflict-free diamond trade.

In Jetley’s view, this enlightened switch left the Nigerians without the better emoluments that go with serving in the UN, besides leading the Nigerian ECOMOG force commander, who wanted to lead a Nigerian-heavy UNAMSIL, high and dry.

The Nigerian interest, per Jetley’s revelations, was in continuing on a good wicket with the RUF, who controlled the diamond rich areas.

Evidently, Jetley put a spanner in the works. This is entirely believable.

Jetley was bitter at the treatment he received. Instead of the UN backing him, he was relieved, with the excuse that an expanded Force component required that a three-star general head it.

To his credit, Jaswant Singh, a staunch military man who was then foreign minister, shot back that Jetley was in any case due for a promotion, so should be retained. The UN disregarding the entreaty, India sensibly pulled out its contribution to the mission.

That the Indian contribution was exceptional is clear from the later half of the book, in which Jetley details the planning and conduct of the Operation Khukri, the breaking of the siege of Kailahun, where a couple of Indian companies were besieged by the RUF.

This recount is another contribution to military history and is sufficiently legible for military enthusiasts to follow with sufficient comprehension.

At the recent book launch at the premises of the United Services Institution, a film-wallah was present, who indicated that he was thinking through a film project on this. There is enough masala in the episode that he would not need to add any Bollywood spice witnessed of late in films like the one on Uri.

Even so it bears reflection that a book that covers the breakout of the two companies from their hostage situation at Kailahun by the senior of the two company commanders has it that they shot their way out.

While it is true that the RUF was around, so were civilians. They ended up targeting civilians while levelling the village, in violation of the Protection of Civilians (POC) mandate of the mission.

It is uncertain if this was warranted in terms of proportionality and discrimination, given the final casualty figure of the two-day operation was one killed and six wounded.

Instead of a highpoint in Indian peacekeeping success as Jetley’s account places it, the worm’s eye view from the book brings the operation under a cloud.

General Jetley was demanding of professionalism and persuasively argues that the UN deserves a better deal from its troop contributors.

However, even though a Chapter VII cover was available for robust use of force, any such use had to be below the threshold level of rupture in strategic consent. The general was aware of the limitations in equipment and deficits in professionalism of the elements under him. He best knew that his resources were stretched, leading to a lack of reserves.

Therefore, the apprehensions in some contingents of a fight with the RUF escalating - as had indeed occurred in the last round of civil war in ECOMOG’s presence - were not unfounded. Even Op Khukri was made possible only when the mission received reinforcements, which included the Indian infantry battalion made famous by the immortal Vikram Batra.

A deficit in the book is in Jetley only in passing mentioning one key feature of the mission’s mandate, that it was the first mission with an explicit POC mandate, termed thus: ‘Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, decides that in the discharge of its mandate UNAMSIL may take the necessary action to ensure … within its capabilities and areas of deployment, to afford protection to civilians under imminent threat of physical violence…’

Had Jetley dilated on this aspect – on how the mission implemented this – it would have enhanced the book with another input to the history of peacekeeping.

An aspect understandably missing in the book is the wider military experience of Jetley. It would have introduced the writer to readers who may not know the Indian army and its leaders that well.

Jetley could have in such a chapter talked briefly of his experience as commander in Siachen and, later, his very significant role in the Operation Parakram, as evident from the recent biography of General Rostum Nanavatty.

The biography informs that Jetley had only in October taken over the corps with a dual role of an ‘ad hoc strike corps’ on the western front and had not in the interim till the parliament attack familiarised with its conventional operations role.

Nanavatty’s recommendation for a three-week preparatory period was perhaps the key factor that kept the two countries from war. While obviously these details need not have figured in the Saga, Jetley’s reflections on this would be of interest.

Back to the book’s content, it can be said that Jetley’s predicament was timely in that back then the UN was contemplating taking peacekeeping up a notch with the Brahimi report. Jetley talks of missing meeting Brahimi during his New York trip, perhaps because by the time he got round to it after a bout of malaria, the report had already been tendered in early August.

However, Jetley’s painstaking observations on shortcomings and shortfalls in UN missions were taken onboard, as the following extract from an SG report echoes Jetley’s call for quality in contributions:

enhancing the strength of UNAMSIL will ultimately depend on the willingness of Member States to make the necessary well-trained and well-equipped troops available to the United Nations, as well as on the continued support of the troop contributors. Assistance from Member States having the capacity to train and equip current and future UNAMSIL units will be crucial in this regard.

To be sure, Jetley’s book is not quite as significant or as well produced as that of Romeo Dallaire’s, Shake Hands with the Devil. While Dallaire was pitch-forked into the worst of all nightmares, a genocide, Jetley’s book covers a more common scenario peacekeepers find themselves in.

It can never reliably be said that the UN is out of the woods on games member states, especially the powerful ones, play. The situation in regard to diamond-laden Sierra Leone is currently at replay in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

In the DRC imbroglio, who is Sankoh, Taylor, Kabbah etc. and which countries are using which proxies, as the M-23, and which powers lurk in the background, is anyone’s guess. Clearly, the book is a valuable read because history repeats itself.

The book’s relevance is in the take-aways for India and the UN.

Indian diplomats need to stay engaged with mission trajectories across mission life where Indian troops are engaged, especially when crisis is at hand – such as now in South Sudan.

It is moot whether the Indian diplomatic corps in upper three digits has the bandwidth, but it could optimally use the cohort of military attaches seconded to it.

India should not be shy to follow the precedence set of withdrawal from a mission in case it’s interests, or norms of the international community, are being flouted, as may be the case in DRC.

As for the UN, it needs to be wary of being manipulated. It needs enforcing standards across the board, lest, for instance, in its current outsourcing of peace enforcement in Africa to African forces comes a cropper. It must continue on the ‘politics first’ approach to reduce the premium on efficacy of intervention forces.

At best, Jetley can be faulted for being too much of a soldier and not enough of a politico-diplomatic new-model military leader.

But even this criticism can well be taken the other way round - to Jetleys’ credit - for had he been less of a soldier, complicit in silence, successive UN missions would have been worse off.

Therefore, Jetley’s feeling of dejection from being let down by the UN must stand moderated. He stands tall in peacekeeping history, not so much from Op Khukri’s conduct, but from his standing up for standards the UN must itself insist on.

In fact, the later, successful avatar of UNAMSIL had Jetley’s imprint on it, since he participated in its framing, though on his way out.

By all accounts, with efforts of stalwarts as Jetley, UN peacekeeping has come of age, but regrettably just when dissonance in the Security Council appears to have put peacekeeping into a twilight zone.

Note: Lt Gen VK Jetley, The Unforgettable Saga of Sierra Leone, Gurugram: Jet Books, 2025, pp. 538, Rs. 700/-