Another Modi masterstroke: A regime favourite as CDS

The Modi regime is now well known for its masterstrokes. However, the appointment of General Anil Chauhan as the second Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) is not another surprise pulled out of its hat. General Chauhan did figure as a front runner at points in the race. While other contenders fell out progressively as the parameters of the appointment changed, retrospectively it seems that the rejigging of these – by allowing all three-star brass a shot at the post, even those retired but below 62 years of age - was almost designed to see him first past the post.

The announcement

The surprise was in the announcement taking this long, since General Chauhan has been around all the while and could well have been elevated well earlier. It is strange that his tenure as the military adviser in the National Security Council Secretariat is not mentioned in the press release, though it makes a generic reference to his continuing engagement with security matters even after superannuation – mentioning twice over that he retired in May 2021. Was this oversight to obscure the conflict of interest that might have figured in his advice on the selection, given that as military adviser he must surely have had a say on who succeeds General Rawat?

The press release mentions one of two of the responsibilities that go with the appointment of CDS, making clear that he would also serve as Secretary of the Department of Military Affairs. The second responsibility – Permanent Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee – has not found mention. However, when General Rawat was appointed CDS, the press release made no mention of the two main responsibilities.

These were reckoned as part of the CDS’ package of responsibilities written up in the press release when the post was created. Perhaps an explicit mention of the Secretary role is to dispel the idea doing the rounds that the role of secretary demeans the CDS appointment in protocol terms, while saddling him with bureaucratic responsibilities that he could well do without. Even so, there was no reason to be so responsive to rumours as to categorically dispel them in the press release.

The silver lining from the ‘deep selection’ taking this long is the regime did not find sufficiently politicised generals.  However, it appears that the regime finally found a candidate with the pliability levels it is comfortable with. When General Rawat was appointed Chief of the Army, since he superseded two seniors, the regime had gone out its way to impress army watchers that the reason for the choice was the doctrine of ‘ease of doing business with’ – as one veteran tasked with the messaging put it in his advocacy for the unprecedented supersession back then. It is plausible that ‘relative ease of working’ with is aided by a shared ethnicity. Is it a coincidence that not only was Rawat Garhwali, but so is Chauhan, as is National Security Adviser, Ajit Doval?

Even so - as a distinguished veteran brought to this author’s notice - the regime has taken care to keep the sword hanging over the new CDS’ head by making the appointment - though allowing for the incumbent to go on till 65 years - tenable only ‘till further orders’!

The surgical strikes’ controversy

General Chouhan has demonstrated a high pliability quotient, which his appointment suggests has paid off handsomely. During the last national election, a political controversy arose on the surgical strikes of 2016. Chauhan in his capacity as Director General Military Operations (DGMO) then, intervened in famously answering a Right to Information (RTI) query that his directorate had no record of surgical strikes prior to the one executed in 2016. This punctured the opposition’s view that surgical strikes were de rigueur, only political parties per convention did not help themselves to the credit as did the ruling party in wake of the surgical strikes of 2016. For its part, the Congress had listed six operations it had overseen in its time, which this reply dashed to the ground. Though this transpired just after the elections, the controversy preceded it and can be expected to have had an effect on the outcome, feeding the information war surrounding the aerial surgical strikes that decisively shaped the outcome.

The RTI query itself was perhaps provoked by an exchange well prior to elections between the successive commanders of the Army’s Northern Command – Generals Hooda and Ranbir Singh. In retirement, Hooda, though avowedly apolitical, had drafted a national security policy for the grand old party, the Congress. This was a first of its kind document in fleshing out a national security doctrine to complement a political party’s manifesto. He was commanding general at the time of surgical strikes in wake of the Uri attack, while Ranbir Singh was the then DGMO.

Hooda held that surgical strikes were part of the Indian Army repertoire on the Line of Control. Though the strikes in 2016 were of a different order of magnitude, he was not in favour of these being over-hyped. In rebound, Ranbir Singh said, "From military point of view, these were successful tactical operations, which conveyed a very strategic message and the Indian Army was able to convey a very clear message to Pakistan that should they not stop any kind of misadventure along the LoC, they shall be given befitting reply." The matter might have rested at this, since neither general was saying anything outside military logic.

Chauhan as DGMO settled the controversy in Ranbir’s Singh’s favour, deflating the opposition’s clamour. His reply was quoted by Ranbir Singh in a press conference subsequent to elections. Both generals know very well that the reply was a lie, as do all who have served in the Indian Army and on the Line of Control of both sides, India and Pakistan.

Raids have been conducted across the Line of Control (LC) and the Congress contention that some of these trans-LC operations were in their time at the helm is certainly true. That the two generals held a belief to the contrary suggests they were trimming their sails to the prevailing wind. As is the wont of the regime in going after those who challenge it and rewarding those that do its bidding, both generals have been suitably rewarded.  Though Ranbir Singh was an early front runner for the CDS appointment, he received a sinecure as head of the Army’s think tank. Chauhan was made Military Adviser for his services, that continued in like vein even after his DGMO tenure.

Chauhan does not rest on his oars

Chauhan in his next appointment as Army Commander, Eastern Command went further. Taking cue of his regiment officer, CDS Rawat, he went on to egregiously comment on the anti-Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) protests. Recall, Rawat while speaking about leadership at a lecture, quite unnecessarily bad mouthed those on the barricades in defence of the civic concept of citizenship that informs the Constitution. CAA had overturned this in favour of an ethnic concept of citizenship, in line with the Hindutva philosophy of the ruling party. Since this was immediately prior to him being appointed CDS, it shows up a tacit criteria for the appointment: being a regime spokesman.

Rawat, true to form by way of which he had acquired a notoriety for discoursing on matters outside the military’s traditional pail, with confidence acquired from his proximity to Doval, had waded into the CAA controversy in favour of the regime’s position. Chauhan, over at Kolkata, chimed in similarly, saying, “The current government is keen on taking hard decisions that that have been pending for a long time. The Citizenship Amendment Bill was passed despite reservations from a couple of North Eastern states.” 

CAA intimately affected people in his Command’s area of operation. Since there was a potential for backlash - one that his statement shows he was aware of, presumably in reference to a potential blowback in Assam – his statement was of a political nature and, worse, was jarringly gushy. But then high achievement in this regime requires candidates for higher office to be suitably volubly and sycophantic. Recall the effusiveness in Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s presence of the justice who went on to head the National Human Rights Commission.

Is General Chauhan professional?

Had the general stuck to his brief as a military man, at the time his eyes should have been pinned on what was happening across on the Tibetan plateau. His Command frontage witnessed a brief border flareup in North Sikkim, coincident with the Chinese intrusion in Ladakh. It is for the record that the Eastern Command’s frontage remained inert during the entire Ladakh crisis, with the commanding general only recently seeming to suggest that this was a good thing. Instead, there is viable case to be made that even if - for the sake of argument - Ladakh was imposed on in a manner that it could not strike back, there is no reason why Eastern Command could not needle the Chinese as a counter move?

Clearly, accountability for this inaction is to be laid at Rawat’s door, since as CDS he had a view of the entire frontage and could have shifted the weight of India’s response in a manner as to outpoint the Chinese. However, Chauhan could have also bottom-up agitated for having a go at the Chinese in theatres of advantage. Only the previous autumn, the Army had conducted exercises validating the Integrated Battle Group concept in Arunachal Pradesh. Troops were therefore readily available and well-practiced. The Command had stood up to the Chinese at Doklam. Chouhan did not have the imagination nor gumption to call the Chinese bluff on escalation. Both regime favourites – Rawat and Chauhan – thus let their side down.

The masterstroke – in regime terms

The regime is not about to take on the Chinese. As seen in its response to Ladakh, it has gone in for a policy of appeasement, trading space in the form of buffer zones for quietude. It has rationalised this with the argument that the time gained will be used to narrow the gap in comprehensive national power. What it would not let on is that the time gained gives it the space to consolidate Hindutva, the philosophy that informs the foundation of New India.

The regime came to power after ten years in the political wilderness, after much manipulation of the political field and the electorate’s perceptions. Polarisation was instilled by a fake narrative of a Muslim threat manifested in false flag bombings across Indian cities. A Hindu vote bank was thus created.

Alongside, a champion was manufactured in Narendra Modi as a larger-than-life figure who could be expected to be strong-on-defence. The narrative was bolstered by the hype over the surgical strikes. Though the landward surgical strike was a credible feat, the strategic outcome was shown up in the following Pulwama terror strike. The aerial surgical strike was a failure, as was the Indian response to Pakistan’s aerial riposte.

Gaining a second tenure at the helm owed to a higher voting percentage and number of seats brought about by the information war over the military’s showing in both strikes, and at Doklam against the Chinese. This was swiftly taken advantage of for pushing the regime’s ideological agenda, first in Kashmir and then with CAA.

It is evident that the crackdown in Kashmir had the backing of the military, even though in its advisory function it should have brought home to the regime that regime interest is not necessarily Indian interest. Even if - as Foreign Minister Jaishankar points out the feared number of deaths have not occurred – it does not take a peace studies professor to know that the problem has only been kicked down the road.

Violence indices mean nothing if the problem has not been tackled politically. What’s unfolding in Kashmir – with a gerrymandered election coming up - cannot be taken as a political ‘solution’, since it can only aggravate matters. It’s for the military, charged with the mandate of counter insurgency, to point this out. It has a secondary role in internal security; and, so must have a say.

This raises the question: What was Chauhan’s input as DGMO when Amit Shah evacuated Article 370 of any worth? It can be reasonably surmised – that just as many other brass hats – his input – if any – was a green light.

Then is the case of Agnipath. Rumour has it that Rawat was no in favour of this scheme. It is to General Naravane’s eternal credit that the regime had to wait him out before launching it. This begs the question what was the role of the two military advisers – Chauhan advising Doval and his predecessor in the post of military adviser, General Khandare, now advising Defence Minister Rajnath Singh? It is only befitting that Chauhan is now saddled with implementing what he perhaps advised favourably on: Agnipath.

What kind of CDS do we now have?

This implies the regime either has a like-minded or a ‘Yes Man’ as CDS. Like-mindedness is better than being a ‘Yes Man’. The former implies having a mind with an inclination that coincidentally happens to be aligned with that of the regime. A ‘Yes Man’, on the contrary, follows the dictate.

It would be fair to speculate that Chauhan is inclined towards a particular political position. Globally, most generals vote conservative. From Chauhan going out of his way to conform to the regime’s position, it cannot be readily ascertained that he publicly subscribes to its position of his own volition or has been put to it. If the former, then like-mindedness can be conceded. If nudged to intervene on the regime’s behalf, then it would show him up as pliable.

Here is cannot be irrefutably said either way of what make Chauhan is. That he has been elevated to CDS post makes a dim view of him credible. Even if this is mitigated by him being like-minded, it is still not in line with a traditional view of civil-military relations anchored in an apolitical military, going about its professional task and not interfering in political matters.

Our reading shows that Chauhan has not only been sub-professional in the two areas he could have made a difference: Kashmir and the response to Ladakh; but, has also made uncalled for political interventions. The primary finding of military sociology is that political and professional do not cohabit comfortably in the military brass.

The regime has a CDS it deserves

Regime interest is in a like-minded CDS, aligned with its ideology and willing to look the other way or participate in its implementation. The regime’s ambition is to upturn the secular pillar of the Constitution’s basic structure. When it goes about that, it would not like a backlash. It is setting the conditions for this already: witness the defanging of Muslims – one quarter from which protest might be expected - in the ongoing pursuit of the Popular Front of India.

As part of preliminary operations towards this end, the regime is taking care to render the military inert. A military sensitive to its guardianship role as regards the Constitution may take umbrage to its overturn. The regime has insured against such a hurdle coming its way, by putting the military to a professional till on high mountain fastnesses in the Himalayas. It is making the military chase its tail in restructuring into theatre commands at the higher level and into battle groups at the lower end. The military has been further hobbled by the Agnipath scheme. Thus, just as the other institutions of the State have been rendered ineffectual, the military has also been domesticated.

This explains the delay in getting a new CDS into place. The regime has a CDS who has a proven record of docility. No doubt socialisation into the regime’s thinking would have continued when Chauhan was Military Adviser. Thus, from the regime’s perspective, he is the right choice. The next crisis at the border or in Kashmir will show whether what is good for the regime is also in the national interest. The regime – and the nation - will find out if the masterstroke was a safe gamble.