Indian Army fails the diversity test

Appraising the social composition of its officer intake

Last month the ‘Running Boy’, Pradeep Mehra, inspired the nation with his passion for joining the army. His jogging at night on Delhi’s roads on his way back to his lodging from his work place was captured on video by a passing film maker and went viral. A veteran general officer got in touch with the Colonel of the Kumaon Regiment who promised to assist the youth to join his regiment, Mehra being from Uttarkhand (UK). Though Mehra caught the imagination of the country, he is not an exception. There are hundreds of UK youth who tread a like path. It is no wonder UK is a leading contributor to the army officer corps, with some 74 making it to officer ranks from the Indian Military Academy (IMA) of the 653 commissioned in 2021. Thus, a state short of 1 per cent of India’s population contributed over 10 per cent of its officer intake last year.

Another vantage - from a social angle - throws up a contrast. A community with 14 per cent population share of India – its Muslims - contributed a mere 16 of its youth to the 2 courses that took the ‘Antim Pug’ at the Academy’s Chetwode Building in its December 2020 and June 2021 passing out parades (POP), making for 2.5 per cent. Considering that India trains some 55 foreign gentlemen cadets per term from friendly Muslim countries as Afghanistan, Tajikstan and Maldives, of the Muslims trained at IMA for the 2 terms only 15 per cent are Indian.

Interestingly, the IMA gives out the state-wise numbers of GCs taking part in its POP. Understandably Uttar Pradesh takes the top slot for its contribution of its youth, with its commissioned numbers matching its population percentage of India (around 17 per cent). In the 2 terms examined, a cluster of north Indian states – UK, Punjab and Haryana – comprising some 5 per cent of India’s population sent 30 per cent of the officers commissioned.

From this cursory glance, two points need highlighting. Not only is the officer cadre suffering from a geographical imbalance but also a social one. Given that the military is not a site for affirmative action and application of the policy of reservation, it can be inferred that the numbers of Scheduled Tribe and Scheduled Caste cadets is negligible. Since the two categories – and India’s Muslims – are subject to deprivation in terms of opportunities for education, it is unlikely that they appear for the officer candidate exams and even fewer make the cut of those appearing due to lower standards from poor exposure to educational opportunities. Between them they comprise over a third of India’s population but turn out perhaps about 5 per cent of India’s officers.

Not a call for reversing the policy of merit-based intake into the military, there is nevertheless a case for ensuring a level play field for the military officer academies’ entrance exams. Apparently, a 100 odd Sainik Schools are to come up for serving as feeders into the military academies, of which some 20 were sanctioned this year. The reservation policy that Sainik Schools currently have is hopefully being extended to these schools. The sub-reservation for Muslims in the Other Backward Caste and other such lists should also be respected. The geographical spread of the schools envisaged needs examining separately so that numbers from underrepresented regions are enhanced alongside.

The Muslim proportion is highlighted here – not least since this author has kept an eye on these for over a decade now – and proven that the figure of 2-2.5 per cent entry of Muslims into officer ranks is consistent. Though pointed out over a decade ago as a gap, nothing much appears to have changed. Neither is the community seized of the matter, nor is the democratic State bothered that it is missing a prominent minority from its officer ranks. This aspect has been normalised since Partition. The military appears to be yet another area where the community’s deprivation indices find reflection.

The situation is such that not a single Indian Muslim officer figures in the two IMA journal issues examined for this article, Spring Term 2021 and Autumn Term 2020. There is only 1 Muslim officer in the group photos, he being the Afghan colonel keeping an eye on the 100 odd Afghans trained at the IMA in the period. (With the takeover of Kabul by the Taliban, the training of Afghans has come under cloud.) Of the 284 strong instructor body – counting from photos of the faculty staff – that includes weapons, physical, equitation training teams etc – there are only 9 Muslims at non-officer rank, or 3 per cent. The senior is a lone Subedar. Five of the 9 are equitation instructors, since 61 Cavalry – the only horsed regiment along with the President’s Body Guard - has a smattering of Muslims. In short, the rest of the Indian Army of over 1 million troops could send only 4 Muslims to IMA to train its officers from its 30000-odd Muslim troops, a figure that if not inflated by inclusion of the Jammu and Kashmir Rifles, would have been a revealing one.

This should not have been the case a decade since the aspect was pointed out as a problem by this writer (https://www.epw.in/journal/2018/4/strategic-affairs/missing-muslim-army-officers.html;  https://ali-writings.blogspot.com/2018/01/the-missing-muslim-army-officers-vol.html?spref=tw). Clearly, it was known to the Indian Army too, else how does one explain its withholding of figures using bombastic language to ward off the Sachar Committee seeking the figures from across the State apparatus. That the Army was then led by a Sikh - a prominent Indian minority community - did not help. Is it that the status quo persists to keep the numbers up of the communities advantaged by the Army’s recruiting patterns? Reports have it that the Indian Air Force abandoned recourse to geographical representation hiring as per a state’s recruitable male population numbers and has now ended up with an over-representation from Uttar Pradesh. The advantages of cornering military numbers are in a proportion of the budget coming the way of the community, through pay, perks, pensions, canteen privileges and the retirement health scheme, not to mention employment opportunities in a time of dire economic straits.  

Military sociology not being particularly popular an academic subject, no experts point to all this as a lacuna. Defence studies departments are also rather few and are statist in their orientation and output. There is no sign of a National Defence University. Some 10 years since the foundation stone was laid of this university way out of Delhi, and 8 years into the era of a regime that values its strong-on-defence image, is it perverse to think this may be to enhance the profile of the Gujarat-based Rashtriya Raksha University? From the stasis on this, I am cynical enough to prognosticate that the RRU will be converted to the NDU soon enough. (Incidentally, Gujarat contributed five officers in the two courses examined here making less than one per cent from its all-India population share of short of five per cent.)

In any case, Indian academia has not been particularly effervescent lately. The Left’s academic presence has been decimated. Thus critical insights are few and far between. Instead, the national security community is seized with issues as integration of traditional thought and spiritual troves into strategic discourse. This no doubt helps with developing a strategic culture and giving it an ‘Indian’ orientation. However, when restricted to the ancient tomes, there is an element of artificiality rather than organic development in strategic culture. Is the medieval period exported to Pakistan?

The civil-military relations experts look at higher profile issues as fusionism in the ministry etc. India has to rely mostly on foreign scholars like Cohen, Rosen, Jaffrelot and Wilkinson, to look at itself, warts and all. The likes of Kundu are too few from within its ranks. Critical perspectives on the nature of the Narendra Modi regime, that appeared on at the cusp of last elections - such as of Neerja Gopal and Jaffrelot - had commentaries from all manner of experts ranging from the economy to caste, but no chapter was devoted to the military. At best strategic orientation of the regime is the focus, mostly in hagiography equivalent works such as by Chaulia and Gokhale. No one has taken a reflective look at how the social complexion of the military opens it up to the politically dominant and socially pervasive Hindutva and what the implications are for national security.

A look at the complexion of the future Indian military leadership can be had from the profile of the Academy appointments given in the two volumes of the IMA journal examined. Though not necessarily so, a higher proportion of such ‘early starters’ is likely to figure in the future brass. There are 26 GC appointments at the Academy level, GC company-leading Senior Under Officer upwards. In the 2 terms, 6 were from UK, 6 from Punjab and 9 from Haryana. As seen, the 3 states, comprising some 5 per cent of India’s population, contribute 30 per cent of the GCs and corral 40 per cent of the higher appointments. From South India, are two from Maharashtra and one from Andhra. There are two each from North East, Nepal and Delhi. J&K has three and Gujarat one. Muslims are all but missing in action with only one in each course was made an appointment: a Junior Under Officer and another a company quartermaster.

The schools GCs making it to higher appointment are also a somewhat narrow set. Sainik schools bagged 13 appointments of the 26 higher appointments or 25 per cent. Even these Sainik Schools were mostly located in north India, with Korukonda southern-most. Army Public Schools had eight, while the Rashtriya Military Schools had seven. To their credit, six were formerly from the ranks, from Army Cadet College. Kendriya Vidyalayas were next with three; Rashtriya Indian Military College - the elite military cadet school that just celebrated its centenary - scored one in each term; the Armed Forces Preparatory Institute at Mohali had two, and Navodaya Vidyalayas, one. Others were from assorted schools, with none of the elite schools figuring on the list. In earlier times, ex-students of public schools – such as Lawrence, Mayo etc - and Kendriya Vidyalayas did figure. Now, with the said 100 odd schools coming up, more narrowing is not impossible to visualize, unless broad-basing these schools is consciously done prior and these be kept out of grasp of the Hindutva ecosystem. This demands political interest of the order of Motilal Nehru and Jinnah during the Indianisation debates.

By no means does an officer cadre need to be elitist. In fact, those joining it these days are from India’s aspirational classes. However, there is a pronounced geographical imbalance, which - as the Pradeep Mehra case shows up - is only increasing. This, alongside bridging the longstanding gap – India’s missing minority – needs both debate and follow up action.

Muslims need to come up with a similar arrangement as they have for cracking the civil services exam. The idea and initiative by General Zamir-ud-din Shah, on this score, need to be taken forward. Muslim legislators must make a din on assuring reservation for Muslim wards in the Sainik Schools coming up. There is no reason for the community to deny itself the educational largesse. Increased numbers of Muslims in officer ranks will indubitably shut up right wing propaganda that further marginalizes the minority. It must reach out for such avenues of advancement opening up for counterpart communities.

My argument has been that if we have a narrowing base for the officer cadre the politics of its catchment area cannot but be reflected in the officer corps. This is a bias that can potentially politicise the officer corps.

Secularity is at best a rear guard action. Secularism is intrinsic to modernity. Only a modern military can be a 21st century one. Besides, a military of a democratic India must reflect its diversity. The road roller of majoritarianism is flattening diversity. This is mistaken as a national security gain in terms of resulting unity ending fissiparousness. But it’s an inadequately theorised work-in-progress and a national wreck is not unimaginable. Intellectual cudgels must be taken up with the military open to sharing statistics it claims it does not maintain.