Op Sindoor: Interrogating its professed aims

In his very first briefing on Operation (Op) Sindoor, Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri gave out the aim of the operation thus: “India exercised its right to respond and pre-empt as well as deter more such cross-border attacks.”

The statement covers three aspects: the right to respond, the right to pre-empt and deterrence. All three are likely to be elaborated on by the visiting Indian all-party delegations to various capitals.

How does each measure up to closer scrutiny?

‘Right’ to respond?

The ‘right’ to respond invoked by India appears to be from an expansive reading of United Nations’ Charter Article 51, that is phrased as: “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council…”

India maintains that it has been subject to Pakistani proxy war with an irridentist aim in Jammu and Kashmir. The terror attack of 22 April at Baisaran meadow in the vicinity of Pahalgam that took 26 lives is only the latest instance of such a war. Misri pointed out that there was no “demonstrable step from Pakistan to take action against the terrorist infrastructure on its territory or on territory under its control.” Given Pakistani inaction, India was forced to ‘exercise its right to respond’.

The right to respond is evocative of the inherent right to self-defence. Since terrorists had targeted India, the response was targeting of known terror locations in Pakistan. The Indian foreign minister informed that a distinction was made of not targeting the Pakistan military. It was communicated to Pakistan, so that its military would take the ‘good advice’ and stay out of the ensuing fight.

In his briefing the following day, Misri held that Pakistan was dilatory in pursuing terror suspects, even when furnished with evidence by India at past occasions, 26/11 and Pathankot. Therefore, to rely on Pakistan to turn in the terrorists and their handlers to justice would only give Pakistan a handle for another ‘cover up’ and obscuring of its tracks.

Pakistan, as Misri pointed out, is a haven for terrorists. Given its interest in keeping the Kashmir problem alive using terrorists as proxies, it is certainly ‘unwilling’ to go after them. It is also perhaps ‘unable’ to do since it cannot dismount the tiger it has long been riding.

The argument goes that Pakistan being ‘unable and unwilling’ to tackle terror emanating from its soil, confers on India a ‘right to respond’.

Pakistan’s unwillingness to rein in terrorists targeting India has context. An intelligence-led proxy war is on between the two sides making Pakistan unwilling to dismantle its handle against India. While it is true that it seeks to negotiate with a gun held to its own head, its inability due to its vulnerability cannot be elided in analyses.

Does this confer on India a ‘right to respond’?

For now, Charter-based international law accords no such right, though there is advocacy on an ‘emerging right’. The logic has been used by the United States (US) and its protégé, Israel, to rationalise their multiple wars.

If India were to expand the permissive range of self-defence, then it would be participating in dismantling international law as it currently stands. It is afoul of Charter obligations, which can only call into question its bid for a Security Council seat. A self-regarding leader of the global South aping states that have lost both credibility and moral authority, would further buffet the international system.

Self-defence seems to be interpreted perversely in Kashmir. Over 2000 youth taken into custody, of whom at least three have died in questionable circumstances. Worse, over 10 houses have been demolished by controlled explosions, within months of Supreme Court guidelines to the contrary. Encounter sites have been routinely demolished earlier under a wilful misreading of para 4(b) of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act which allows demolishing of a ‘hide-out’. The clause framed with jungle hideouts in mind, is abused for collective punishment without accountability.

Going the dozer route away from rule of law, the army in Kashmir is of a piece with the navy, that under cover of Op Sindoor, allegedly disgorged Rohingya refugees corralled in Delhi into the Andaman Sea off the coast of Myanmar; even as the central armed police shoved Bengali migrants herded from Gujarat into the Bangladesh side of the Sundarbans.

Clearly, there is more to Op Sindoor than only self-defence.

Finally, the requirement of taking the Security Council into confidence at the outset has been missing. Self-defence of the first night mutated into escalation dominance by the last night. In his briefing, Misri suggested that India’s military action was in conformity with the call in the Council’s press statement on “the need to hold perpetrators, organizers, financiers and sponsors of this reprehensible act of terrorism accountable and bring them to justice.” By no means did the Security Council encourage the ‘force of Indian arms’.

The Security Council was convened by its elected member, Pakistan, for an emergency closed door session. The last time it met on the issue after several decades was in August 2019. Since it was a closed session India was not invited. Its permanent mission’s website has no activity on Pahalgam and Op Sindoor, other than its existing link to its parent ministry’s website.

Activity anywhere with portents of a nuclear fallout is a legitimate international concern and not quite a bilateral matter as is India’s wont on Kashmir. Other measures available, such as a UN-conducted investigation as was the case in the Mohtarma Bhutto and Hariri assassinations, make self-defence less persuasive as an option. At hand is also a UN mission, much neglected by India and the good office services offered by the Secretary General.

‘Right’ to pre-empt?

Since self-defence is permissible, it encompasses pre-emption. While pre-emption is anticipatory self-defence, prevention as casus belli has not acquired the imprimatur of international law. State practice does exist on prevention, but this has not met with state endorsement enough to make the cut for customary international law.

Pre-emption as reason has figured twice earlier: in the surgical strikes that followed Uri and Balakot. In the former case, it was plausible, given the proximity of launch pads raided to the Line of Control (LC). In the latter case, the action was at best preventive since the target was a training camp. The 250 madrassa students who allegedly perished at Balakot could only be under indoctrination, with deployment well down the line. Getting across the LC requires extensive familiarity with the lay of the ground and coordination – all of which take time. As the terror attack (terror attack) requiring pre-emption was not imminent, Op Bandar was not pre-emption. Hesitance to use the right term ‘preventive’ is because even Bush, Jr. was not allowed to get away with his preventive war rationale for the US’ ‘forever wars’.

Likewise, this time round not all 100 who perished can be said to have been terrorists. Only those who had participated in terror attacks in Kashmir and returned for rest and recuperation (R&R) can be counted as such, others being aspirants. If all 100 were on R&R, it does say something about the competence of security forces in Kashmir. Terrorist family members are civilian. The five major terrorist handlers killed does not make for proportionality in light of civilians killed.

Semitic and Indic mythology has stories of exceptionally villainous monarchs killing babies at birth, lest one of them grow up to dislodge them, showing prevention can be stretched unrecognisably. Take Israel’s occupation of the Golan Heights and destruction of Syrian military assets even as Islamists took over the country last December.

In Bahawalpur and Muridke, taking seminaries as jihadist training hubs can only serve to create conditions for more such centers. Thus, the ‘pre-emption’ on the first night is better termed as ‘preventive’; while the action – liable to be counter-productive - is less preventive than provocative. Perhaps this explains Prime Minister Modi’s reference to Pakistan thus: “it will destroy Pakistan one day.”

Deterrence well-served?

India’s third rationale – deterrence - found mention in the rationalisation of the Uri and Balakot episodes. Evidently, the two manifestly failed to deter. ‘Deterrence by denial’ clearly failed; while ‘deterrence by punishment’ can only have succeeded momentarily, till Pakistan makes up for its technology deficits in air defence with Chinese support.

By clubbing terrorists and the Pakistani state together in its new doctrine, only the latter might be deterred. The verities of deterrence do not apply for terrorists. There are also other wheels churning such as domestic militants in an insurgency that can upset the applecart.

For its part, Pakistan got even on the first night itself, visible in the Rafales standing down thereafter. If India’s losses – accepted frankly as existing by the air ops chief though not quantified – are factored in, Pakistan may not be as deterred as the post-op triumphalism has it.

That Pakistan has a newly minted field marshal implies they know something Indians don’t yet know. Could it be the number of Rafales Munir felled that got him a marshal’s baton?

Besides, deterrence as any security studies undergrad knows also involves reassurance too. There is no reassurance provided to Pakistan: its waters will be interdicted and peace is but a pause. Sans reassurance, deterrence isn’t enough.

To be sure, India is already embarked on retaining escalation dominance, but reliant as it is on a domestic military-industrial complex (MIC) expect the pathologies of such a complex to dent expectations.

The indigenous MIC is designed to be leader of the ‘Make in India’ and the atmanirbharata initiatives, designed to self-perpetuate crony capitalism. This will serve as yet another push factor for crisis. Deterrence is never all there is to security and the finger on the trigger is not necessarily that of terrorists.

Deterrence is oftener used in connection with the nuclear domain. Given Pakistan’s propensity to reach for the nuclear card, India has declared it will not countenance ‘nuclear blackmail’. Its confidence owes to a belief that it has called out Pakistan’s nuclear bluff thrice over.

However, Pakistan’s nuclear threshold was never so low as to cover the subconventional level or the lower end of the conventional level. By the logic of India’s own Cold Start doctrine, Pakistan’s nuclear threshold is high enough as to be even permissive of Cold Start offensives.

To mistake nuclear signaling for nuclear blackmail might lead to a deterrence breakdown. The risk arises in demonstrating resolve to call what’s (mis)taken as a nuclear bluff. If and since deterrence is meant to secure, how India is secured by running the risk remains unexplained in the new doctrine.

India secured?

A co-briefer, Wing Commander Vyomika Singh, added an aim: “OPERATION SINDOOR was launched by Indian Armed Forces to deliver justice to the victims of Pahalgam terror attack and their families.” (Colonel Qureishi’s remarks in Hindi not found translated on the webpage have therefore not been perused by this Hindi-challenged South Indian author.)

On their part, the armed forces have delivered up retributive justice. Holistically, however, justice requires addressing root causes. An ostrich-like policy – ‘we will discuss only return of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir’ – is a negation.

The problem with the discourse on terrorism is denial of any rationale for terrorism prompted by the fear that any excuse would lend it legitimacy. However, the incidence of terrorism oughtn’t to impact legitimate pursuit of conflict resolution in conflicts that often frame terrorism. Not addressing root causes allows terrorism oxygen in the resulting political and psychological milieu.

The belief that conflict management is better than conflict resolution stands exposed. With wrong lessons learnt hastily from Op Sindoor, a fourth instance is guaranteed. Adopting an Israel-like ‘mow the lawn’ strategy misses that Israel has lately bought itself insecurity for multiple generations.

Op Sindoor is thus just another step closer towards – to paraphrase strategic doyen General DK Palit - a Southasian communal riot with nukes.